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ABSTRACT 
 
The more we know about the causes of corruption, the better 
we can decide which policy instruments to use to combat corruption. 
The primary question of this article is: how can the causes of corruption 
in Western countries be studied? Here, an overview is presented of the 
causes of corruption mentioned in the literature using the kind of 
causality of explanations of corruption as an organizing principle. Six 
groups of theories are distinguished concerning causes of corruption, 
paying attention to the discourse on corruption control these groups of 
theories lead to. A primary conclusion is that there are not many studies 
on actual, individual corruption cases. It seems, therefore, that we need 
more contextual corruption research; many current studies lack 
contingency. The overview also makes clear that the theoretical model 
chosen determines, for a large part, the direction of the proposed 
solutions. Different causal chains lead to different discourses on 
corruption prevention and corruption control. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In October 1994, Piet Neus, former alderman of the 
Dutch city of Maastricht, received a one-month suspended 
prison sentence and was fined 10,000 Dutch guilders (about 
5,000 US dollars) for accepting gifts valued at 42,000 
Dutch guilders (about 21,000 US dollars) from three local 
companies in the form of household renovations (Dohmen 
1996: 237). Just after his conviction, Neus commented, “I 
still believe I did nothing wrong. Society apparently 
disagrees. The judge considered the postponed payment for 
the renovation of a kitchen a gift. I have to respect that 
verdict” (Dohmen 1996: 218). 
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With that incident in mind, the primary question of 
this article is: how can the causes of corruption in Western 
countries be studied? The more we know about them, the 
better we can decide which policy instruments to use to 
combat corruption. But what are causes? Let’s look at the 
example of Piet Neus again: why did it occur? This 
question seems straightforward for students of Public 
Administration. On closer inspection, it is not. To answer 
it, we first have to ask ourselves: what do we really want to 
know? After all, the 'why' question can be interpreted in 
many different ways.  
Maybe we mean to ask: why did this corruption 
case start? In that case, we seek out the immediate causes 
and circumstances of the corrupt transactions and decisions. 
We look directly at the corrupt acts themselves.  
Or do we want to know why the corruption case 
continued over a period of time, possibly in connection 
with other cases? (This is in fact what happened; see 
Dohmen 1996.) If so, we are less interested in the exact 
conditions by which the corruption case occurred than we 
are in the readiness of Piet Neus to become corrupt.  
Perhaps we want to know why this particular 
corruption case occurred rather than not. Were there 
alternatives for Piet Neus, or was he ‘forced’ to do what he 
did? Was corruption, given the causes and conditions, his 
only course of action? This raises questions concerning the 
‘determinism vs. freedom’ debate, which here will be left 
aside. 
Maybe we are looking for the causes of this 
particular case of corruption, which gets most attention in 
corruption research (and in this article). In this context, are 
we interested in the causes of corruption that are external to 
the corrupt act itself? Or are we interested in the actual 
process of Piet Neus’s corruption? The first interpretation is 
the most popular in the literature – not surprisingly, since 
social sciences usually deal with concepts rather than 
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processes and thus ‘freeze’ reality (Schinkel 2004: 8). 
Corruption is then studied in an abstract sense, looking for 
the governing laws of corruption at a meso or macro level. 
As we shall see later in this article, in individual corruption 
cases, it is quite tricky to identify causal links. 
Another possible interpretation of the ‘why’ 
question is: are we interested in the reasons and motives for 
Piet Neus to become corrupt? In Neus’s statement, he 
expressed amazement about his conviction. He claims that 
he did not know he was corrupt, but that “society 
apparently disagrees.” This brings us to an issue often 
raised in philosophy, that is, whether reasons for action can 
or should be seen as causes of action and, if so, in what 
sense can they be treated (Schinkel 2004: 8). This debate, 
too, will be left aside here.  
As we shall soon discover, there is a tension in 
corruption research (as in other social research) between 
actors being regarded as autonomous agents making 
(bounded) rational means-end calculations, and explaining 
corrupt behavior by causes beyond individual control. In 
the latter case, the corrupt agent ‘disappears’ along with the 
corruption that is being studied: even though the corrupt 
agent is the source of the corruption, he or she is reduced to 
background characteristics, translated into variables. This 
leads to certain factors that can be relevant to 
understanding the motives for corruption, but it draws 
attention away from the corrupt practices and the corrupt 
agent. The central argument of this article is therefore that 
we need more contextual corruption research; many current 
studies lack contingency.  
However we interpret the question of what the 
causes of Neus’s corruption were, it implies a kind of 
causality. In this article, I give an overview of the causes of 
corruption mentioned in the literature using the kind of 
causality of explanations of corruption as an organizing 
principle. I distinguish six groups of theories concerning 
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causes of corruption, paying attention to the discourse on 
corruption control these groups of theories lead to. The 
overview leads to a call for more contextually-based 
research on corruption, for which we need a theoretical 
model. In constructing one, a synthesis of the six groups of 
theories on the causes of corruption would be interesting, 
but two problems arise: the theory groups employ different 
levels of variables, and they have different implicit or 
explicit causal models. We will later discuss these 
problems and possible solutions.  
Instead of synthesizing the theory groups, one could 
look for an alternative causal theory. One such possibility, 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social action, will be briefly 
discussed in this article. Bourdieu’s theory is suitable to 
study the case of Piet Neus and similar cases. By 
combining macro and micro factors and everything in 
between, it would be well suited as a theoretical model for 
corruption case studies.  
Before discussing the causes of corruption, we 
should heed the words of Caiden (2001: 21): “Just as there 
are many varieties of corrupt behavior, so there are 
multitudinous factors contributing to corruption … So 
many explanations are offered that it is difficult to classify 
them in any systematic manner.” Adds Heywood (1997: 
426): “The complexity of the phenomenon makes it 
impossible to provide a comprehensive account of the 
causes of political corruption.” Caiden (2001: 21-26) 
mentions the following ‘sources’ of corruption: 
psychological, ideological, external, economic, political, 
socio-cultural and technological. Factors that contribute to 
corruption, however, are of course not the same as causes 
of corruption. “In sum, corruption can be attributed to 
almost anything … But while the opportunities exist 
everywhere, the degree of corruption varies widely among 
individuals, public agencies, administrative cultures, and 
geographic regions.” (Caiden 2001: 26). Fijnaut and 
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Huberts remark: “Research shows that a conglomerate of 
social, economic, political, organizational and individual 
causal factors are important to explain cases of public 
corruption” (2002: 8).  
 
Six Kinds of Causes of Corruption 
In much literature (e.g., Fijnaut and Huberts 2002), 
a distinction is made between the causes of corruption in 
lower income countries and the causes in higher income 
countries; low salaries and poor working conditions greatly 
improve the chances of corrupt instances occuring. In this 
article I concentrate on the causes of corruption in Western 
(i.e., high income) countries, where corruption is much the 
exception (Caiden 2001: 27). 
Great attention has been paid to the question of 
what corruption is (e.g. see Rose-Ackerman 1999: ch. 6). It 
seems that every article on corruption starts with an 
overview of the many definitions. Here, I choose the 
following definition: “behavior of public officials which 
deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private 
ends” (Huntington 1989: 377).1 What is noticeable about 
this much-used definition is its emphasis on social 
constructivism: corrupt is that which is considered corrupt 
at a certain place and at a certain time. After all, ‘accepted 
norms’ change over time. Remember also that Neus 
disagrees with his conviction. Yes, in his eyes, ‘corruption’ 
(in general) is wrong, but he claims that what he did was 
not corrupt. Being corrupt is not always a matter of black 
and white. The norms at a certain place and at a certain 
time are not shared by everyone. Officials can also be 
‘more’ or ‘less’ corrupt. A public official illicitly receiving 
5000 euro  is ‘more’ corrupt than one receiving 500 euro. 
And, research shows, people regard a police officer who 
asks for 20 euro from a speeding driver so he can ‘forget’ a 
ticket as being more corrupt than a police officer who 
accepts 20 euro when it is offered to him. A comparison of 
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research on public attitudes towards corruption concludes 
that: “Over and over, the research found that respondents 
judged elected officials more severely than they judged 
appointed officials; judges more severely than police 
officers; bribery and extortion more harshly than conflict of 
interest, campaign contribution, and patronage; and harmful 
behavior more harshly than petty behavior” (Malec 1993: 
16). What is consistent in all discussions about corruption, 
however, is that corruption is wrong; it is always a 
deviation from right moral conduct. People disagree about 
the norms that determine whether someone is corrupt, not 
about the reprehensiveness of ‘corruption’. So as soon as 
someone is labeled ‘corrupt,’ he or she is morally judged in 
a negative way. Corruption is a morally loaded term. Just 
like ‘integrity’ is a (morally) positive label and everyone 
seeks it, corruption is a negative label. Since our views 
about morality differ in many respects, corruption is also a 
contested label. Neus does not state that he was corrupt, but 
that his acts of corruption were permissible (morally and 
legally); he disagrees that he was corrupt. 
When looking at the literature on corruption we 
notice a difference between studies that put forward 
propositions about the causes of corruption (in other words, 
studies that theorize about the causes of corruption) and 
those that empirically try to establish the causes of 
corruption. The latter sort of studies is by far outnumbered 
by the former. 
Before I give an overview of the kinds of literature 
on the kinds of causality of corruption, I would like to 
stress that every classification has its blind spots. Of course 
there is overlap, and maybe some theories resist the 
classification given here, but the overview should make 
clear that the concept of causality differs in the wide 
literature on corruption. 
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Table 1 
 Causal chain Level of 
analysis of 
causes 
(independe
nt 
variables) 
Level of 
analysis 
of 
corruptio
n 
(depende
nt 
variables
) 
The 
context 
Most 
common 
research 
methods 
1. Public 
choice theory 
A ‘free’ official 
making a 
(bounded) 
rational decision 
that leads to a 
more or less 
predetermined 
outcome.  
Individual  Micro 
and 
macro 
Situational 
aspects 
mostly 
ignored; 
they 
cannot 
account for 
triggering 
causes. 
Starts from 
the 
moment 
the actor 
makes a 
calculation
.  
Mostly 
theoretical 
2. Bad apple 
theories 
A causal chain 
from bad 
character to 
corrupt acts. 
Individual Individu
al 
Attention 
to 
individual 
backgroun
d. 
Theoretical 
3. 
Organizational 
culture 
theories 
A causal path 
from a certain 
culture – a 
certain group 
culture – leads to 
a mental state, 
which leads to 
corrupt behavior. 
Facilitating 
factors are 
described which, 
in some cases, 
strengthen a 
causal chain. 
Organizati
onal 
Organiza
tional 
Organizati
onal 
structure 
and 
culture; 
correlates 
to number 
of 
corruption 
cases. 
Situational 
aspects 
and 
contingenc
ies mostly 
ignored. 
Mostly 
theoretical 
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4. Clashing 
moral values 
theories 
The causal chain 
starts with certain 
values and norms 
of society, which 
directly influence 
the values and 
norms of 
individuals. 
These values and 
norms influence 
the behavior of 
individual 
officials, making 
them corrupt. 
Societal Societal Situational 
aspects 
reduced to 
moral 
conflicts of 
individuals
. 
Mostly 
theoretical; 
some case 
studies 
5. The ethos 
of public 
administration 
theories  
A causal path 
from societal 
pressure – often 
though the level 
of organizations 
on officials to 
perform and lack 
of attention to 
integrity issues – 
leads to a focus 
of the official on 
effectiveness, 
making him or 
her corrupt. 
Societal 
and 
organizati
onal 
Societal 
and 
organizat
ional 
Situational 
aspects 
mostly 
ignored; 
no 
explanatio
n of why 
some 
officials 
become 
corrupt 
and others 
do not. 
Theoretical 
6. Correlation 
‘theories’ 
No causal model, 
only correlations. 
All levels All 
levels 
Situational 
aspects 
and 
contingenc
ies 
ignored; 
focus is on 
variables. 
Surveys, 
expert-
panels 
 
Public Choice Theory 
First, there is rational choice theory: public choice 
theory. For the independent variables to explain corruption, 
it primarily looks at the level of the individual. 
The causal chain is that of an individual making a 
(bounded) rational decision that leads to a predetermined 
outcome. Central to the public choice literature is the 
individual corrupt official who tries to maximize his or her 
utility. The individual (usually male) is portrayed as a 
rationally calculating person who decides to become 
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corrupt when its expected advantages outweigh its expected 
disadvantages (a combination of possible penalty and the 
chance of being caught). This group of causal theories is 
made popular by Rose-Ackerman (1978), who claims that 
public officials are corrupt for a simple reason: they 
perceive that the potential benefits of corruption exceed the 
potential costs. Or as Klitgaard (1988: 70) states, if the 
benefits of corruption minus the probability of being caught 
times its penalties are greater than the benefits of not being 
caught, then an individual will rationally choose to be 
corrupt. Of course, the theory can be expanded when 
conditions that influence the cost-benefit calculations are 
taken into account. For example, trust can play an 
important role. When the state cannot be trusted to manage 
private property transfers, corruption might become more 
appealing (Gambetta 1993). Also, trust within close 
personal relationships increases the chance of getting the 
benefits from the delivered corrupt ‘services’ or reduces the 
chance of getting caught. In this kind of theory, actions of 
corrupt officials are caused by a rational, conscious and 
deliberate weighing process of an individual. In its purest 
form, autonomous agents are assumed to make more or less 
rational means-end calculations. This contrasts with most 
of the other theories we will consider, where behavior is 
explained by causes beyond individual control. In 
organization sciences, this is closely related to decision 
theories. The reason is that just how ‘choices’ (which have 
the character of volition) cause actions (of a physical 
nature) must be made clear. In some theories, rational 
choice is combined with game theory and ideas that agent 
choice is bound by both the decision-making capacities of 
individual agents and a surrounding structure of political, 
economic and cultural rules (institutions), leading to a so-
called institutional choice framework (Collier 2002). 
When we try to picture the causal chain in the case 
of Piet Neus, we would see him weighing the advantages of 
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the promised gifts against the chances of being caught and 
the possible negative impact that would have for him. 
Apparently, Piet Neus made the conscious decision that the 
benefits were worth the risk.  
The advantage of public choice theory is that it has 
relatively close focus (Schinkel 2004: 11). Instead of 
looking for general determining factors, it concentrates on a 
specific situation of an agent (a corrupt official) who 
calculates pros and cons. In that sense however, it is 
insensitive to the larger social context (which is something 
public choice in general has often been criticized for). It 
cannot account for triggering causes within the situation. 
The theory starts from the moment an official calculates 
whether to become corrupt or not. The question then 
becomes: why are some officials corrupt in many Western 
countries while most are not? If some calculate that 
corruption is a good deal, are the others, by not becoming 
corrupt, making ‘bad’ calculations? In other words, what 
have we explained with rational choice theories alone? 
Public choice theories lead to a discourse on 
corruption control that maximizes the costs of corruption 
and minimizes the benefits.2 Since the benefits of 
corruption are much harder to influence, most of the focus 
is on the costs of corruption. These costs can be made 
higher by improving the chances of getting caught and 
imposing steeper penalties. This can easily lead to a 
discourse asking for a comprehensive system of control 
based on surveillance, massive information gathering, 
auditing, and aggressive enforcement of a wide array of 
criminal and administrative sanctions (Anechiarico and 
Jacobs 1996). 
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Bad Apple Theories 
Second, bad apple theories, like public choice 
theories, primarily look at the level of the individual 
corrupt agent for the causes of corruption. 
These studies seek the cause of corruption in the 
existence of people with faulty (moral) character, the so-
called ‘bad apples’. There is a causal chain from bad 
character to corrupt acts; the root cause of corruption is 
found in defective human character and predisposition 
toward criminal activity. Causes are rooted in human 
weaknesses such as greed. When the focus is on the faulty 
character of an official, morality is assumed to determine 
behavior (like in the forthcoming clashing moral values 
theories): people are assumed to act on the basis of moral 
values. ‘Wrong’ values are therefore the cause of 
corruption. Of course, one can question whether people act 
on the basis of moral values (see de Graaf 2003). But the 
focus on individual corrupt officials and their motives can 
also be of a different nature.  
When we think of the case of Piet Neus, the causal 
chain in his case would start with moral vices on Neus's 
part. His ‘wrong’ moral values directly influenced his 
behavior toward corruption. Of course, if we believe in 
such a causal chain, new and interesting questions surface: 
how did Piet Neus acquire these moral vices? Did he have a 
bad childhood, or does he have a genetic propensity toward 
corruption?  
‘Bad apple’ theories are less popular than they used 
to be. Punch (2000: 317) writes on police corruption: “In 
the past there was a tendency to think of corruption as a 
temporary, exceptional ‘problem’ to be removed by 
‘surgical’ treatment, as if it was a malignant cancer, to 
restore an otherwise healthy agency (the ‘bad apple’ 
metaphor). Conventional wisdom has shifted recently to see 
corruption as near universal and as forming a permanent 
concern.” We see the assumption of the ‘bad apple’ often 
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made explicitly or implicitly in the literature, but hardly 
ever based on empirical claims: the assumption is most 
often theorized. 
What is clear from research using criminological 
theories (which are somewhat related to the bad apple 
theories – more on this later) is that stating that the corrupt 
official is merely after material gain (public choice 
theories) is too much of a simplification. The official could 
also be seeking a higher social standing, excitement, work 
pleasure or a cure for frustration (Nelen and Nieuwendijk 
2003: 43/44). For example, Cusson (1983) distinguishes 
thirteen goals of perpetrators of crime. Literature shows 
that the agent rationalizes and legitimizes the corrupt 
behavior and does not regard the behavior as corrupt. 
Recall, for example, the statement of Piet Neus.  
In contrast to the following theories, these 
(criminological) theories do not lead to an emphasis on 
ethics management. The particular discourse on corruption 
controls they lead to is determined by the particular 
(criminological) theory that is used. Social control theory 
(seeing in the delinquent a person relatively free of intimate 
attachments, aspirations, and the moral beliefs that hold 
most people to a life within the law (Hirschi 1969)), 
focuses on factors that should keep people from criminal 
activities. One could imagine corruption control based on 
such a theory. However, I know of no study combining 
criminological theories on individual motives for 
corruption with public administration and concrete 
suggestions for corruption control. When the root cause of 
corruption is sought in human weaknesses, ‘strong moral 
values’ are named as an antidote (Naim 1995: 285), but 
designing a policy to combat corruption with this medicine 
seems improbable.  
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Organizational Culture Theories 
Third, some literature is not so much interested in 
the background or motives of the corrupt official, but in the 
culture and structure of the organization within which the 
agent is working. For the first time, we are looking not the 
micro level of individual corrupt agents, but the meso level 
of their respective organizations.  
The underlying assumption seems to be that a 
causal path from a certain culture – a certain group culture 
– leads to a certain mental state. And that mental state leads 
to corrupt behavior. Failure in the “proper machinery” of 
government, not faulty character, leads public officials to 
act corruptly. Therefore, it accounts for the context corrupt 
acts occur in. For example, Punch claims (2000: 304) 
(when talking about corruption within police departments 
around the world): “If we scan these activities then it is 
plain that we are no longer dealing with individuals seeking 
solely personal gain but with group behavior rooted in 
established arrangements and/or extreme practices that 
have to be located within the structures and culture of 
police work and the police organization.” Punch concludes 
(2000: 317): “The implication is that in tackling corruption 
and other forms of police deviance, it is vital to focus on 
group dynamics, the escalation from minor to serious 
deviance, and on the negative elements in the police 
culture.” Piet Neus's case would be explained by a culture 
within his municipality (Maastricht) in which everyone is 
corrupt. This influences Piet Neus in such a way that he 
'cannot help' but become corrupt himself. 
Once again, in these theories there is a causal path 
from a certain culture, a certain group culture, that leads to 
a mental state. And that mental state leads to corrupt 
behavior. But we could question whether this is a causal 
link at all, since not all people in the described 
organizations become corrupt. At best, we could say that 
these theories describe certain conditions under which 
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corruption occurs. But that, too, is probably saying too 
much. It is more a matter of describing ‘facilitating factors’ 
which, in some cases (not all people in the organization 
become corrupt), strengthen a causal chain. These types of 
theory are not so much interested in the corrupt official, but 
in the contextual features that make for the setting of 
corruption. In that sense, these theories are not really about 
the causes of corruption. Implicit in most of these theories 
is the contention that people in organizations act on the 
particular dynamics of the organization. Of course, many 
good arguments involving economic, natural or social 
forces, for instance, show that institutions (not in the sense 
of organizations or buildings, more in a sense of collective 
ways of thinking, feeling and doing) determine, in large 
part, the decisions and behavior of people. There are 
dynamics that transcend individuals. In that sense this 
group of research distances itself from methodological 
individualism. 
This brings us to a related group of theories of 
corruption that should be grouped here, those that see 
corruption as ‘contagious’ (e.g. Klitgaard 1988; Caiden and 
Dwivedi 2001; Hulten 2002). These theories state that once 
an organizational culture (or country) is corrupt, every 
person who comes in contact with it also runs a big risk of 
becoming corrupt. Therefore (and interestingly enough) 
corruption itself seems to be the ‘cause’ of corruption (even 
though the specific causal relationship is hard to define). 
These theories sometimes use the metaphor of the ‘slippery 
slope’ (Punch 2000). Not becoming corrupt in certain 
organizational cultures means betraying the group (Jackall 
1988, Punch 2000). 
These theories lead to a discourse on corruption 
control in which the emphasis is on influencing the culture 
of an organization, the so-called ‘cultural instruments’ by, 
for example, altering the organization’s leadership 
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(Trevino, Weaver et al. 1999; Trevino, Hartman et al. 2000; 
Huberts, Kaptein et al. 2004).  
 
Clashing Moral Values Theories 
A fourth branch of literature makes a distinction 
between the public role and private obligations of corrupt 
officials. As distinguished from the previous theories, 
corruption is considered on a macro level, more precisely, 
the level of society. Since the culture of an organization is 
also influenced by society at large, there is an overlap 
between this group and organizational culture theories. 
The causal chain in these theories starts with certain 
values and norms of society that directly influence the 
values and norms of individuals. These values and norms 
influence the behavior of individual officials, making them 
corrupt.  
In many societies no clear distinction exists 
between one’s private and one’s public roles. Rose-
Ackerman: (1999: 91): “In the private sector, gift giving is 
pervasive and highly valued, and it seems natural to 
provide jobs and contracts to one’s friends and relations. 
No one sees any reason not to carry over such practices into 
the public realm. In fact, the very idea of a sharp distinction 
between private and public life seems alien to many 
people.” Private appropriation of the spoils of office is not 
regarded as morally reprehensible or illegitimate. Here, as 
in the second group of theories, morality has an opportunity 
to cause behavior and thereby cause corruption. In many of 
these theories, values are assumed to determine behavior. 
Because of a clash of values connected to one’s private and 
one’s public role, choices have to be made. And certain 
values lead to corruption. Out of obligations to friends or 
family (which can be very important in certain cultures), 
officials take bribes. Thus it is not so much selfish personal 
gain the corrupt official is after, but rather the agent feels a 
need to be corrupt to fulfill important personal (moral) 
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duties, like ensuring loyalty to friends and family. As some 
say in Latin American countries, a los amigos todo, a los 
enemigos nada, al extraña la ley– for my friends 
everything, for my enemies nothing, and for strangers the 
law.  
In the case of Piet Neus, his personal ties with the 
contractors was such that he felt obliged to help them with 
commissions, just as they felt obliged to help their friend 
with the renovations. And friends do not charge each other 
for such things. So the consience of Piet Neus was the 
direct cause of his corrupt behavior. 
In this group of theories, the antagonism between 
two value systems is central, like in the theories of Weber 
(1921) and Habermas (1984). Hoffling (2002: 71) speaks of 
micro morality and macro morality. Micro morality has to 
do with connections to people in our social circles (family, 
friends). It is about values, norms and moral obligations in 
our daily personal and social lives. Even though obligations 
from the micro morality are based on informal norms, they 
are very strong – much stronger than our moral obligations 
towards strangers. Moral obligations in our personal lives 
are characterized by reciprocity: we help friends and family 
just as we expect them to help us. The macro morality, by 
contrast, emphasizes the universal. It is the product of the 
process, as described by Nelson (1949), of universalizing 
morality and claims the legitimacy of its norms on 
institutions of the law, a universal system of formal norms. 
The macro morality is characterized by the 
complementarity of rights and duties as the primal modus 
of social ties. For its existence, it depends on societal trust 
in the compensating mechanisms of social institutions. A 
problem of the macro morality is its higher level of 
abstraction, which limits the chances of internalizing its 
norms. Conflicts in society arise when persons see 
themselves in two social roles with opposing moral 
obligations: the macro morality of public officials requires 
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them to treat different persons equally, where the micro 
morality requires them to favor friends wherever possible. 
Especially in the vast literature on Third World countries 
(Williams and Theobald 2000), a popular theme is 
patrimonialism, leading to patrimonial administration in 
which the private-public boundary (micro versus macro 
morality), central to the (Western) concept of public 
administration (Weber), is blurred. Corruption is often seen 
(ethnocentrically) as a phase developing countries have to 
through before reaching maturity. Despite widespread 
agreement  in the literature (Theobald 1999) that neo-
patrimonial character is the root cause of corruption in the 
Third World, Theobald issues a warning (1999: 473): 
“There is a danger that we are simply describing symptoms 
rather than identifying underlying causes. There is after all 
a certain lack of specificity in the concept in the sense that 
it has been employed in such a range of empirical contexts 
– from Brazil to Zaire, from Paraguay to the Philippines – 
which raises serious questions about its analytical utility.” 
Since instances of this group of theories for explaining 
corruption are most common in studies of lower income 
countries, I leave it aside here. We do know, however, that 
even though the obligations from macro morality might be 
stronger in Western countries, micro morality is also very 
strong (Jackall 1988, Bauman 1993). We can also think of 
hypothetical cases, say, a sick child, in which large sums of 
money are needed for a public official, leading him or her 
to become corrupt. Also, certain patronage ties can be 
identified in Western countries that are sometimes 
connected to the causes of individual corruption cases (e.g., 
Dohmen 1996). Think of ‘old-boy networks’, alumni 
networks, Rotary clubs, fraternities and the like (see Perkin 
1996). 
These theories lead to a discourse on corruption 
control in which codes of conduct and their enforcement 
play an important role. ‘Ethical training’ also is popular. In 
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general, attention is paid to ethics in these models (Kaptein 
1998; Kaptein and Wempe 2002) rather than rules, threats, 
surveillance or coercion. In the Third World literature, the 
discourse is on the elimination of patronage and cronyism, 
and calls for merit-based principles in administration. Of 
course, when underdevelopment of a country is seen as the 
cause of corruption, development is the cure. However, it is 
clear that economic development is by no means a 
guarantee for eliminating corruption. In current literature, 
corruption is often seen as deep-rooted, common and 
permanent; it is in all social systems, organizations, age and 
gender groups (Alatas 1990; Williams 2000: x). 
 
The Ethos of Public Administration Theories 
The fifth group of literature is closely related to the 
third group (organizational culture), but varies in that the 
major concern is the culture within public management and 
society in general. Like the previous (fourth) group, we are 
mainly looking at corruption from a societal level. Like the 
third group, the organizational level plays an important 
role: the macro factors (unlike the previous group) work 
through the level of organizations instead of the individual.  
In these theories, political and economic structures 
are studied. Officials’ performance has a causal path from 
societal pressure through the level of organizations. This, 
combined with a lack of attention to integrity issues, leads 
to a focus of the official on ‘effectiveness,’ making him or 
her corrupt. It is feared, for example, that public sector 
reforms, under the influence of New Public Management 
(NPM), change the culture within public management (the 
meso level) in such a way that standards of ethical probity 
within public services are affected negatively, leading to 
more instances of corruption. Thus the impact of NPM is 
on the organizational level, which influences the officials; 
from this point, the causal path of the third group of 
theories is followed. Economist approaches that do not 
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address the ethical dimension of public service or support 
virtues like public interest, guardianship, integrity, merit, 
accountability, responsibility and truth, have, according to 
some, subverted the ethos of public organizations (e.g. by 
undermining public trust) , thus leading to more corruption. 
What Heywood calls ‘the structural approach’ (1997: 427) 
to political corruption, in which the emphasis is on the 
nature of state development (with administrative 
organization and efficiency as key variables), would also 
fall into this group of theories. Also, arguments are put 
forward that developments like NPM, deregulation and 
privatization (Doig and Wilson 1997) have created 
significant structures for influence-peddling (Heywood 
1997: 429) and have removed agencies that provide for 
public accountability.  
Let us say that Piet Neus’s constituency and 
political superiors stressed to him that what mattered most 
was achieving his policy objectives; his responsibility was 
to build roads and preferably at a fast pace. This led Neus 
to focus on result which, in turn, led to frequent consults 
with building contractors (over dinner, at the golf course, or 
even on the French Riviera) on how practical problems 
could be solved as quickly as possible. This in turn led to 
good contacts with certain contractors and roads being built 
quickly, but also to Piet Neus paying less attention to 
personal integrity, accountability and legitimacy of his 
decisions. In fact, the causal chain used in Dohmen’s 1996 
book describing the case of Piet Neus is similar. Factors at 
the macro level – huge sums of money funneled from 
central government into Neus’s province of Limburg, a 
feeling of 'being different' in the province, a political 
culture in which one political party (CDA) was always in 
power, small social circles – led to a culture and structure 
in public organizations that nurtured corrupt practices.  
Literature from a subgroup of this fifth type focuses 
on the morality of a society that can be ‘wrong’, leading to 
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corruption. We see this causal model most often in (older) 
literature on corruption in the Third World (e.g. Wraith and 
Simpkins 1963). “Why does the public morality of African 
states not conform to that of the British? Their answer 
seems to boil down to one simple cause: avarice!” 
(Theobald 1999: 471). In other (economic) literature on 
corruption in underdeveloped countries, social and political 
characteristics of nation states are part of the ‘explanation 
of corruption’ (Leys 1965). 
Empirical research in this group seems non-existent, 
probably because the causal link, like in the previous group 
of theories, is so indirect that the claim, as true as it may 
be, is hard to support empirically. To discuss corruption in 
this way is of course complex and multifaceted. 
Theoretically the claim is powerfully supported by many; 
see, for example, Frederickson (1993, 1997) and Gregory 
(1999). Gregory claims (1999: 63): “Especially where such 
reforms have been largely underpinned by the new 
institutional economics and public choice theory, they may 
tend to counter more piecemeal efforts to maintain 
standards of ethical integrity in the bureaucracy. These 
efforts may need to be reinforced by new approaches to the 
rebuilding of institutionalized public service, based on a 
fuller understanding of the important distinctions between 
public and corporate management.”3  
When talking about the structure of the organization 
and the machinery of government, we quickly refer to the 
discourse of Scientific Administration (Taylorism). The 
goals of scientific administration are ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘efficiency’, but the theory also holds that administrative 
integrity could be achieved through administrative control. 
However, scientific administration is out of fashion. Like 
empirical research, corruption control based on these 
theories is quite hard. After all, the culture of a society is 
difficult to influence. It is clear however, that those who 
argue that New Public Management leads to more 
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corruption (Gregory 1999) use a discourse advocating the 
abandonment of (some) methods and techniques of NPM. 
A more concrete example of success in trying to control 
corruption at the societal level is influencing the culture of 
emerging democracies. Seligson (2001) shows that a public 
awareness campaign in Nicaragua was a success; it helped 
raise concern about the negative consequences of 
corruption and had a measurable impact in reducing its 
incidence. 
 
Correlation ‘Theories’ 
The sixth (and last) group of literature puts forth not 
so much a theory on the causes of corruption as it does a 
collection of (very popular) research with certain common 
characteristics. The analysis of the causes of corruption is 
at all levels. 
Correlation theories do not start from an implicit or 
explicit theoretical explanation model (like the previous 
five groups), but from specific factors. The research has in 
common that certain social, political, organizational or 
individual factors are highlighted. The variables considered 
are on all possible levels: individual, organizational and 
societal. For example, campaign finance practices in the 
United States (Williams 1995), or longevity in power by 
elected officials (Heywood 1997: 431), or economic 
development and ‘being a former British colony’ (Treisman 
2000). Then it is often claimed that these factors are 
somehow ‘causes’ of corruption. Usually this is done on the 
basis of percentages or explained variance. If we were to 
add up all the claimed variance of these factors in all the 
research that can be grouped here, it would not be 
surprising if we found a causal construction in which well 
over 100 percent of variance would be explained (Schinkel 
2004: 11). This can be explained of course by the varying 
circumstances between and within countries. Once again, 
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we are warned about making strong general claims on the 
causes of corruption.  
This group of theories does not study (the 
contingencies of) individual cases and would therefore 
have a hard time providing a causal chain for Neus's 
corruption. Based on these theories, however, one could 
say that it is not surprising that Piet Neus became corrupt, 
considering, as hypothetical examples, the fact that his 
party was in power over a long period, voter turnout was 
low, his job was long-held, control structures in his 
organization were weak, his personality dominating, 
etcetera, etcetera. 
These kinds of studies are usually not explicit on 
the causality of corruption. How exactly the causal link 
between macro-variables and the act of corruption should 
be seen often remains unclear. In social science, the causal 
path generally remains in the dark. Often, statistical 
significance is used to signify active causality without 
actual evidence. Noticeable in this regard is the frequent 
correlation between ‘income’ and ‘corruption’. It seems 
that the lower the income of a country, the higher the 
occurrence of corruption. But as Huberts (1998b: 213) 
notices: “it is not clear whether this relationship is of a 
causal nature. The income of a country is for example 
directly related with political system characteristics, e.g., 
with the score on political democracy. Further research is 
necessary to find out how democracy, wealth and 
corruption are related.” In general, of course, we must be 
careful when concluding causality from correlations.  
An example of research of this sixth group is 
Holbrook and Meier (1993). Based on a quantitative 
comparison of registered cases of corruption in the fifty 
American states (conducted by the United States 
Department of Justice’s (1988) Public Officials Integrity 
Section), the level of corruption is correlated with several 
factors. Four categories of explanations are offered. Among 
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the historical and cultural variables, urbanization and 
education are concluded as important influences on 
corruption. Among the political explanations, voter turnout 
and, to a lesser degree, party competition stand out as 
relevant influences. The size of the public sector and 
gambling arrests are considered important bureaucratic 
explanations of corruption.  
Some research of Huberts (1995, 1996, 1998a, 
1998b) is based on an international expert panel survey. 
Questions about public corruption and fraud were answered 
by 257 respondents from 49 countries. Within research on 
corruption, methodologies that use expert panels are very 
popular. The research done by Transparency International 
and its corruption perception-indices are famous in this 
regard. In this type of research, causality is not explicitly 
assumed on the basis of percentages of explained variance, 
yet the reasoning is similar. Experts are asked which social, 
economic, political, organizational and individual factors 
are, in their opinion, important for the explanation of cases 
of corruption which occur in their country (Huberts 1996: 
46). Experts are thus asked which factors correlate, in their 
opinion, with corruption. In that sense, not so much the real 
causes of corruption are discussed. Huberts concludes 
(1998) that the three most important causes of corruption 
are identical for higher and lower income countries. 
Corruption is associated with the values and norms of 
individual politicians and civil servants, the lack of 
commitment to public integrity of leadership, 
organizational problems and failures, the relationship 
between the public sector and business, and the strength of 
organized crime. 
This type of theories leads to a discourse on 
corruption control related to the respective correlations. 
These variables often do not offer much to go by. If 
research shows that urbanization and education of the 
general public are always important influences on 
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corruption, how does it then lead to policy 
recommendations? 
 
The context of corruption. 
The clearest theory on the causes of corruption of 
the six groups seems to be public-choice related theories, 
but in exchange for this clarity, the theory offers 
contextuality. But what is exactly a ‘cause’ in social 
theory? A (very) short reflection is warranted in this article. 
In the philosophy of causality, an epistemological 
and an ontological tradition can be distinguished (Schinkel 
2004). In the first tradition, a cause is the coinciding of 
phenomena where, because the ‘cause’ always precedes the 
‘consequence,’ a belief exists that there is a cause (Hume, 
1990). In the six theory groups that were discussed above, 
this kind of causality was not found because no cause was 
identified that always coincided with the consequence 
‘corruption’. Causes identified in corruption research are 
never assumed to always lead to corruption. (The so called 
‘necessity’ criterion, often named as a criterion for 
causation – in which if A is the cause of B, B must occur 
when A occurs – is such a strong one that it is not used in 
the corruption theories considered here.) 
In the ontological tradition, causality is seen as 
something that ‘actually’ happened. Since in social science 
this is often hard to identify, this is also unhelpful in 
corruption research. In what way does ‘GNP’ or 
‘leadership’ exist, and how can that ‘cause’ a particular 
corruption case? Bourdieu is an example of someone who 
warned against ascribing intrinsic aspects to social 
phenomena since it would amount to naturalization of what 
is socially constructed (Schinkel 2004: 14). A general 
problem for corruption research, as noted before, is that 
rarely are individual corruption cases studied. Therefore, 
the identified causes are not the triggering causes in a 
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particular situation, but most often the predisposing causes. 
This makes it difficult to explain corruption. 
My aim is not to criticize all theoretical models on 
causation in corruption research for not having a hard 
causal criterion from the philosophy of causation. I merely 
wish to reflect on the claims made when we talk about the 
causes of corruption; general problems with causality and 
explanation cannot be ignored. In some cases it is perhaps 
better to speak of studies trying to ‘understand’ corruption 
rather than ‘explaining’ it (compare Weber 1921). The 
theories discussed thus far have given us valuable insights. 
Poverty probably has something to do with corruption. 
Such a macro variable has its influence on an individual 
level. We should nonetheless be careful with the assumed 
causality of poverty on corruption. And, more importantly, 
there seems to be a need for close analyses and studies of 
actual corruption cases along with the many existing 
studies on macro variables. 
A substantial amount of literature states the 
conditions of culture and structure of organizations under 
which corruption is more likely to occur (the sixth group of 
theories). But since these studies are based on panel 
surveys or regression analyses, they are not really about the 
causes of corruption. They are helpful because they can 
help us design organizations and influence their culture in 
such a way that lessens corruption. The problem is, 
however, that the literature suggests many such devices and 
it is not clear under what circumstances which device is 
best used. What works under what conditions at what 
costs? When is what kind of leadership important? How do 
we make sure public ethos continues to support traditional 
public values? Since these theories do not offer a theory 
about the cause of corruption, and are based on general 
research and broad correlations, they do not say much 
about contingency, which is so important for social 
research – especially corruption research because of the 
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aforementioned complexity of the phenomenon. This point 
is an important one Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) make in 
their comprehensive classic study of New York City. It is 
rich in detail and insights; the authors document and 
analyze the manifold liabilities of a vast range of corruption 
control projects. They show how corruption control 
mechanisms, which might make sense when based on 
general research, might not work in a specific context. 
“You name the anticorruption reform, the authors point out 
its severe organizational liabilities” (Silverman 1998: 182). 
The conclusion is that to say more about the causes 
of corruption in Western countries, more research is needed 
in actual corruption cases,4 research with special attention 
to the necessary and sufficient conditions of corruption in a 
particular case. Based on a multiple case study research 
design, theory can be built on the causes of corruption 
(Herriott and Firestone 1983; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1989). 
The focus should be on understanding the dynamics present 
within single cases. Case studies offer the advantage of 
richer details of actual cases and their contextuality. 
Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996: 198): “Using focus groups 
and case studies would generate a mass of data that, when 
analyzed and organized, will probably provide a way to 
move forward with policy experiments.” In case studies, 
attention can be paid to the individuals within their culture 
and organization. What are the rationalizations and 
justifications of those who are labeled ‘corrupt’? We 
already know that the lack of a concrete victim in most 
corruption cases is often mentioned as mitigating 
circumstances (by the corrupt officials), just as ‘economical 
necessity’ is often mentioned to develop a tight network of 
relations in which a ‘necessity’ exists for ‘wheeling and 
dealing’ (Nelen and Nieuwendijk 2003: 44/45). Dohmen 
(1996: 218) noticed in his book on corruption in a 
Netherlands province that none of those convicted by law 
showed any kind of regret. Statements like “Everyone was 
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doing it” or “It was a favor for a friend” or “I still think I 
did nothing wrong” were echoed. Also, among the 
befriended elite who were not convicted, there was not 
much understanding for “the hanging of someone for a 
small foreign trip.” Here, again, we see that corruption can 
only be established based on norms, which are by definition 
local and contextual. Therefore, studies on the causes of 
corruption in Western countries should study the specific 
context of corruption cases. Since I am speaking of 
qualitative research, the concentration should be on the 
validity as a trust in the results of the study rather than 
looking for absolute certainty. It should pay attention to 
both the process of data collection and of story telling. By 
conducting such a study, the contextuality of ethics is taken 
seriously. What many ethnographers have revealed is that 
moral decision-making is situational. Understanding it 
means understanding the particular circumstances 
(possibilities, etc.) of a certain situation. The most 
important contribution of detailed case studies is that they 
would give content to the vague notion of ‘putting moral 
problems into context’ (Hoffmaster 1992: 1427).  
Why does Piet Neus think that what he did should 
not be labeled as ‘corruption’? What justifications does he 
give? How did he get in contact with those he took bribes 
from? What was his relationship with them (for example, in 
terms of ‘trust’ and ‘reputation’)? What did the rest of the 
city officials know about it? And so on.  
Since corruption literature on high income countries 
is often divided in different categories –USA, northern 
Europe (which includes Scandinavia, the Netherlands and 
Britain), southern Europe (which includes Italy, Spain, 
Greece), Australia/New Zealand, and Japan – it would be 
interesting to repeat such a study in these different 
countries to see whether the causes of corruption differ. 
When we have a richer theory on the causes of 
corruption, the hope is that we know better what medicine 
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to prescribe for a particular patient. In that sense it could 
help fill the gap noticed by Van Hulten (2002: 182): almost 
no empirical studies offer conclusions about which anti-
corruption methods work under what circumstances. 
Currently there is much confusion in the literature. “The 
right mix of corruption controls will undoubtedly differ 
from governmental unit and from agency to agency within 
the same governmental unit. Moreover, the optimal mix 
changes over time” (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 198). It 
is safe to say we know next to nothing about which 
corruption controls are most efficient under different 
circumstances. Take as an example the installment of 
something like ‘integrity systems’. Would it have stopped 
Piet Neus from becoming corrupt? Perhaps. Gilman (2000) 
and Huberts (2000) seem to think so. Others, however 
(Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Cooper 1998; Brown 1999), 
certainly disagree and would probably maintain that these 
programs would be ineffective at best. The call for rich 
case studies is in accordance with the conclusion of Menzel 
(2003: 35) after reviewing the body of empirical research 
conducted on ethics and integrity in governance: “The 
research strategies for ethics scholars should include 
greater methodological rigor with perhaps less reliance on 
survey research methods. Such rigor, of course, could 
include contextually rich case studies as well as trend or 
longitudinal analyses that were largely absent from the 
studies examined in this paper.” 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of action:  
disposition analyses. 
Menzel (2003) concludes in the aforementioned 
research on the state of the art of empirical research on 
ethics and integrity in governance that most of the research 
on ethics and governance is not sturdily grounded on 
philosophical/theoretical foundations. Much of the research 
is survey-based with conclusions about correlations 
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between variables. The same can now be concluded about 
the research on corruption. For contextually based research 
on corruption, we thus need a theoretical model. 
 
Since the six groups of theories described in this 
article all had interesting insights into the background of 
corruption, a synthesis of them would be interesting. But 
doing so involves two problems: 
1. The different theories deal with different 
levels of variables. 
2. The different theories have different implicit 
or explicit causal models.  
Huberts (1998a) offers an interesting way out of the 
first problem. When discussing fraud and corruption in the 
police force, he states that three levels of factors are at play. 
At the micro level are those that deal with individuals and 
their work. At the meso level are characteristics of the 
organization, which are distributed among leadership, 
organization structure, personal policy and organization 
culture. Third, there is a whole range of factors on the 
macro level, including changes in criminality, rules and 
laws, and so on. Table 2 illustrates Huberts’s model. 
In this model we see many factors from the 
overview of the six groups of theories, bringing together, in 
a sense, the different levels. Of course, on all three levels, 
factors can be added from other theories. With Huberts’s 
model, however, the second problem remains: how do the 
variables at the different levels lead to corrupt behavior? 
Causality is always based on a theory and its concepts. 
How do the variables determine actions of public officials? 
How do the variables at the different levels influence each 
other and how do they influence officials? How, exactly, 
did the political-administrative system make Piet Neus a 
corrupt official?  
If it turns out that a synthesis between the six groups of 
theories is not possible because their different implicit or 
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explicit causal models are too dissimilar, a choice needs to 
be made. Current and future case studies on corruption 
could be used to answer the question: which of the six 
models helps us best explain corruption in these cases? 
 
Table 2: 
 Types of Causes of Corruption and Fraud  
Individual and work 
1. individual: character and private circumstances 
2. work: type, colleagues, contacts 
Organization 
1. leadership 
2. organization structure 
- size, complexity 
- control, auditing 
- separation of responsibilities 
3. organization culture 
- goals/mission 
- values and norms 
- operational code 
4. personal (policy) 
- training and selection 
- rewarding 
Environment 
1. juridical/law 
2. political-administrative 
3. societal (e.g. criminality) 
Source: Huberts 1998a: 35 
 
Which causal chain makes most sense, and leads to the 
most interesting insights? Of course, we could also look for 
an alternative contextually based causal theory on 
corruption. One such possibility is Pierre Bourdieu’s theory 
of social action (1977; 1990; 1992; 1998). By combining 
macro and micro factors and everything in between, it 
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would be well suited as a theoretical model for corruption 
case studies (Table 3).  
With the mental schemata of Bourdieu, causality is 
easier to understand. I cannot do justice to the rich work of 
the anthropologist and sociologist Bourdieu in this article, 
and limit myself to why I think Bourdieu’s theory of action 
is helpful for corruption research as outlined in the previous 
section. (For a prolegomena to Bourdieu's work, see 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992. For an account in the field 
of organizations, see, for example, Oakes, Townley et al., 
1998; Everett, 2002.) 
Bourdieu was not happy with the dualistic nature of much 
of sociological thinking with a choice of focus on either 
structure or agency,5 micro or macro (Everett 2002: 57); 
here lies the attractiveness of his theory for our purposes. 
Bourdieu dismisses both methodological individualism 
(like much of the rational actor theories in corruption 
research6) and holism; micro and macro is to Bourdieu a 
false antimony. Instead he uses a relational perspective. 
Bourdieu’s theory of action provides a means of linking the 
otherwise isolated factors of the micro, meso and macro 
level. Bourdieu’s theory of action establishes an 
incorporation of macro and micro levels: mental schemata 
are the embodiment of social divisions. An analysis of 
objective structures logically carries over into an analysis 
of objective dispositions (Everett 2002: 58). With the 
concept of ‘habitus’, Bourdieu links the global with the 
local. Habitus is the mediating link between social structure 
(macro) and individual action (micro). Individual cases of 
corruption can very well be analyzed with Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘symbolic capital’, 
‘practice’ and ‘disposition’.  
 A disposition is a concept that Bourdieu uses 
to analyze the immediate, lived experience of agents to 
explain the categories of perception and appreciation that 
structure their action from inside (Wacquant 1992: 11). 
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Dispositions are carried by ‘natural persons’ or human 
agents (Bourdieu 1977: 80). Human agents use perceptional 
and evaluative schemata (definitions of their situations) in 
their everyday lives. To Bourdieu there exists a 
correspondence between social structures and mental 
structures, the schemata; between objective divisions of the 
social world, and the vision and division that agents apply 
Table 3 
 Causal 
chain 
Level of 
analysis 
of the 
causes 
(the 
independ
ent 
variables
) 
Level of 
analysis 
of 
corruptio
n (the 
dependent 
variable) 
Context Most 
common 
research 
methods 
Bourdie
u-
research 
A person 
within a 
certain 
habitus, and 
having 
certain 
dispositions 
and 
predispositi
ons is 
triggered 
into 
corruption. 
All 
levels 
Individual  Contingen
cies of 
individual 
cases is 
central 
Case 
studies 
 
to it. In social research it is important to escape from the 
realism of structures (Bourdieu 1990: 52): we often see in 
research that objective social (macro) relations are 
constructed and treated as realities in themselves, outside of 
the history of the group. Yet we should also watch out for 
subjectivism, with which it is impossible to give an account 
of the necessity of the social world (Bourdieu 1990: 52): 
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Bourdieu proposes that social divisions and 
mental schemata are structurally 
homologous because they are generally 
linked: the latter are nothing other than the 
embodiment of the former. Cumulative 
exposure to certain social conditions instills 
in individuals an ensemble of durable and 
transposable dispositions that internalize the 
necessities of the extant social environment, 
inscribing inside the organism the patterned 
inertia and constraints of external reality. If 
the structures of the objectivity of the 
second order (habitus) are the embodied 
version of the objectivity of the first order, 
then “the analysis of objective regularities 
logically carries over into the analysis of 
subjective dispositions, thereby destroying 
the false antinomy ordinarily established 
between sociology and social psychology” 
(Wacquant 1992: 13) 
 
For corruption research, this means that we should 
study not only regularities of corruption, but also the 
process of internalization of these regularities, or how the 
mental schemata of officials are constituted. 
Human beings operate from ‘mental schemata’, for 
example, definitions of the situation, typifications and 
interpretive procedures.  A primary assumption of 
Bourdieu’s sociology is: “There exists a correspondence 
between social structures and mental structures, between 
the objective divisions of the social world – particularly 
into dominant and dominated in the various fields – and the 
principles of vision and division that agents apply to it” 
(cited in Wacquant 1992: 12). In Bourdieu’s theory, the 
level at which a factor manifests itself is unimportant, so 
long as it leaves a trace in an individual. With all the 
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factors at all three different levels, it was often unclear how 
exactly they worked, how they could lead to corruption. 
But with ‘mental schemata’ this is clearer; we understand 
how that works. A specific trigger in the presence of certain 
dispositions will lead to corrupt behavior. To Bourdieu 
(1990: 53), stimuli do not exist for practice in their 
objective truth, as conditional, conventional triggers, acting 
only on condition that they encounter agents conditioned to 
recognize them. Whether an official becomes corrupt 
depends on his or her disposition to become corrupt. This is 
not to say that (societal or cultural) regularities are absent 
in the behavior of officials: there are social factors that 
work through the individual.  
Dispositions then are a reformulation of we earlier 
called ‘factors of corruption’, which allow more fine-
tuning. One can distinguish several levels of 
predispositions. Contextual research can establish 
dispositions that can lead to corruption. Since these 
dispositions do not always lead to corruption, they cannot 
be called causes in the strictest sense of the word. What is 
important is the receptiveness of an individual to 
corruption, and whether that receptiveness is triggered.  
Now we can also ‘explain’ something about corrupt 
cultures. For example, Piet Neus was an official who saw 
himself surrounded by corrupt officials (Dohmen 1996). 
Dispositions can be so strongly determined by the social 
context that it is hard to escape the behavior of that context. 
When consistently reinforced in certain ideas and acts, it is 
difficult for an agent to step outside that culture. This can 
be compared to subcultural delinquency theory: once 
individuals live in a group culture where violence is the 
norm, it is hard for them to not become violent themselves. 
The research on corruption using Bourdieu’s theory 
of action should focus on the categories of perception, 
appreciation and the lived experience (Wacquant 1992: 7-
9) of corrupt officials. This can be called a disposition 
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analysis, in which the habitus of the corrupt official is 
analyzed. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 105): 
One must analyze the habitus of agents, the 
different systems of dispositions they have acquired by 
internalizing a determinate type of social and economic 
condition, and which find in a definite trajectory within the 
field under construction a more or less favorable 
opportunity to become actualized. 
 
Adds Everett (2002: 71): 
One might also suggest that habitus can be 
investigated by examining its structuring 
components, that is, by examining the language 
and discourse of social agents, and the struggles 
over these components.  
 
Everett mentions that discourse (de Graaf 2003) and 
other textual analyses can be used as insightful research 
techniques for analyzing the habitus. Drummond (1998) 
suggests that the habitus can be seen as a collection of 
stories. This makes narrative analyses (de Graaf 2003: 
chapter 6) a technique that can be used for disposition 
analysis. Everett (2002: 71) states:  
For organizational researchers, this suggestion 
provides not only an opening for an investigation of 
“organizational habitus” (through an investigation of 
organizational narratives) but also a more general link 
between Bourdieu’s theory and the concepts of 
organizational culture, leadership, conflict and change. 
These, Drummond says, can be usefully rewritten as 
organizational habitus (culture), enacted habitus 
(leadership), the imposition and resistance of habitus 
(conflict) and the destruction and replacement of habitus 
(change). 
Were we to make a dispositional analysis of Piet 
Neus, we would first of all listen to his stories. His reasons, 
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habitus, and dispositions would become clearer from the 
way he thinks. We would then study his dossier to see what 
mental schemata of dispositions towards corruption were 
present. In other words, what field of considerations was 
present in this case? We would also look for the more or 
less favorable opportunities that actualized the corruption 
on this case. What triggered it? By studying more of such 
cases we will come to an understanding of what 
dispositions, under what specific circumstances, lead to 
corruption. How was the susceptibility towards corruption 
and under what circumstances was it triggered? A 
predisposing factor could be a cup of coffee. Out of 
multiple (dispositional) case analyses will come regularities 
about and understandings of the causes of corruption. A 
view will present itself of predispositional factors, a 
scheme of dispositions. Causality will then be of such a 
nature that certain determining factors will not always leads 
to corruption. In that sense, we cannot speak of causality in 
the strictest sense of the word.  
 
Criminology 
Recall from the discussion of the ‘bad apple’ 
theories that criminological theories can be used to study 
corruption (see Nelen and Nieuwendijk 2003: 43-48). 
Many different criminological theories exist on the causes 
of delinquency, like strain theories (Merton 1967) and 
social deviance theories (Cohen 1967). In these theories, 
the cause of criminal (corrupt) behavior is not so much 
about values as it is about various individual backgrounds 
and motives. The strong points of criminological theories in 
general, and especially for students of corruption, is that 
they offer models to explain (1) behavior; and (2) 
'criminalizing', or why something is called a criminal 
(corrupt) act. As interesting as this last aspect is for 
corruption research, because of the many different 
definitions and interpretations of 'corruption,' it is beyond 
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the scope of this article. When explaining behavior, 
criminological theories mostly focus on (1) the motive of 
the official; and (2) opportunity. The latter aspect falls 
beyond the scope of 'bad apple' theories. Of course, in order 
to research 'opportunity' in corruption research, models 
from organization science are required to describe (1) the 
characteristics of an organization; and (2) the surroundings 
of an organization. All criminological theories that are used 
in corruption research need adaptation and some sort of 
'translation.' Interestingly enough for students of 
corruption, lack of attention given to so-called 'white collar' 
criminality is a criticism. It is not surprising that many 
elements of criminological theories can be found in the six 
kinds of literature distinguished here, since criminology 
also contains many different causal models. It is a so-called 
'object-science': the only thing that unites the many 
different criminological theories is the research object. 
Therefore, many different portrayals of the agent can be 
found in different theories. Homo economicus is currently 
popular in criminological theories, a view of the corrupt 
agent also present in rational choice theories. In all six 
groups of literature described here, some traces of 
criminological theories were found and some sort of 
criminological variant existed. Most traces however, were 
found in the 'bad apple’ theories. Especially in the older 
criminological theories, criminality is seen as deviating 
behavior that needs to be explained: bad apple theories. The 
current trend (roughly from the 1980s) within criminology, 
however, is not to view criminal acts as deviating behavior. 
Social control theory for example, explains why people do 
abide by the law (Korn and McCorkle 1959; Hirschi 1969). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Interesting to students of public administration is 
that, as it turns out, much confusion exists in the literature 
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on which anti-corruption methods work best under which 
circumstances. The overview made clear that the theoretical 
model chosen determines, for a large part, the direction of 
the proposed solutions. Different causal chains lead to 
different discourses on corruption prevention and 
corruption control. We know little of what corruption 
control works best and most efficiently. More corruption 
case studies should help us with prescription and give us 
more information on what the right mix of corruption 
control is under specific circumstances. After all, proposed 
corruption control mechanisms should not be based on the 
logic of the theory of empirical research, but on what works 
best under what conditions. 
The main question of this article was: how can the 
causes of corruption in Western countries be studied? Six 
groups of theories, each with an implicit or explicit 
theoretical model on the causation of corruption, were 
distinguished. A primary conclusion was that there are not 
many studies on actual, individual corruption cases. It 
seems, therefore, that we need more contextual corruption 
research; many current studies lack contingency. As a 
possible theoretical model on the causation of corruption, 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social action seems promising; 
it is suitable, for instance, to study the case of Piet Neus. 
The study of several of these cases in their context should 
lead to additional theories on the causes of corruption. 
Alternative explanations and understanding of corruption in 
particular countries can help us reconsider the effectiveness 
of existing policy instruments to combat corruption.  
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NOTES 
 
1. Public officials are corrupt when they act (or fail to act) 
as a result of receiving personal rewards from interested 
outside private partners. 
2. Interestingly enough, those public choice theorists in the 
field of Public Administration in favor of NPM also often 
use rational choice as its theoretical base, but argue for less 
regulation. This can be explained by the fact that NPM 
usually ignores integrity violations in its analysis, 
something NPM has been oft criticized for (e.g. Lane 1999; 
Frederickson 1993, 1997.) 
 
3. Incidentally, there are also those who stress that common 
values between public and private sector organizations are 
important too. For example, “the major actors on the world 
stage are gradually realizing that there cannot be two 
different codes of ethics or standards of conduct – one in 
the private realm and the other in the public realm. One 
cannot have a public sector free of corruption when the 
private sector actually tolerates if not rewards corrupt 
practices. Nor can there be a moral business sector when 
the public sector, the government, and the political system 
condone, not condemn, corruption.” (Caiden, and Dwivedi 
2001: 245-255 
 
4. What is and is not corrupt is already heavily under 
debate. To understand the social construction of corruption, 
the context in which the label is used is important. Only 
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that can teach us under what conditions in specific cases the 
label ‘corruption’ is used. 
 
5. Bourdieu sees objectivism and subjectivism, structural 
necessity and individual agency as false antinomies 
(Wacquant 1998). Bourdieu transcends these dualities with 
a social praxeology which weaves together structuralist and 
constructivist positions. 
 
6. “Bourdieu does not deny that agents face options, exert 
initiative, and make decisions. What he disputes is that they 
do so in the conscious, systematic (in short: intellectualist) 
and intentional manner expostulated by rational-choice 
theorists. He insists to the contrary that deliberate decision 
making or rule following “is never but a makeshift aimed at 
covering up misfirings of habitus” (Wacquant 1998: 24) 
